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SEEKING TRUE FINANCIAL REFORM: ENDING THE 
DEBT-EQUITY DISTINCTION 
ABSTRACT 
This Note identifies the failure of Congress to address tax incentives 
for leverage as a principal cause of the recent financial crisis and a fun-
damental flaw of recent financial reform legislation. Specifically, the In-
ternal Revenue Code provides substantially disparate tax treatment for 
debt and equity financing by allowing firms to deduct interest payments on 
indebtedness, but not providing an equivalent deduction for equity fund-
ing. This “debt-equity distinction” artificially reduces the cost of capital 
for debt financing relative to equity financing and encourages firms to 
over-employ leverage in their capital structure. This in turn increases 
financial distress costs and externalities to the economy and increases the 
volatility of capital markets. Though some scholars have proposed to 
allow firms a deduction for dividends paid, such a scheme would create 
additional distortions and introduce the potential for corporate managers 
to substantially manipulate their taxable income. This Note offers an al-
ternative solution by proposing: (1) that the deduction for interest on 
business indebtedness be eliminated, and (2) that policymakers return to 
the idea of the Cost-of-Capital-Allowance (COCA). A COCA deduction 
better aligns the incentives of firms with those of capital markets and 
economies writ large, and encourages managers to seek out the absolute 
cheapest sources of capital while removing tax shelter considerations 
from the decision-making process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On March 16, 2008, J.P. Morgan made an emergency purchase of the 
entire firm of Bear Stearns for $2 a share, although the price had once 
been as high as $211 a share.1 Bear Stearns had been operating with a 
leverage ratio of 30:1, forcing the Federal Reserve to back the purchase in 
an attempt to stave off a broader financial market collapse.2 On September 
14, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter Eleven bankruptcy protection 
after several failed attempts to find a buyer.3 The firm employed a contro-
versial accounting technique known as “Repo 105” to trim $50 billion in 
liabilities from its balance sheet in the months leading up to the bankrupt-
cy filing, artificially lowering the amount of leverage reported to inves-
tors.4 That same week, Bank of America purchased Merrill Lynch in a 
“shotgun” deal arranged with government assistance, and AIG received a 
huge infusion of federal government cash valued at $85 billion.5 Both 
companies also maintained large leverage ratios whereby relatively small 
amounts of equity capital supported vast quantities of financial assets.6 
This Note proposes a method that would limit the necessity of such 
drastic actions by removing the tax incentives of firms to engage in over-
leveraging. All the firms described in the preceding paragraph collapsed in 
part due to skyrocketing leverage ratios and undertaking vast amounts of 
debt to finance their operations. When asset valuations fell below the 
amount of their liabilities, lenders and trading parties began to doubt 
whether these firms could cover their obligations and began a flight to 
liquidity.7 Traders began short-selling their stock, investors attempted to 
liquidate positions, and lenders issued margin calls on their loans in a 
frenzied attempt to recover their capital.8 The margin calls forced these 
firms to liquidate their own positions at fire-sale prices, incurring losses of 
                                                 
1 KATE KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS: THE LAST 72 HOURS OF BEAR STEARNS, THE 
TOUGHEST FIRM ON WALL STREET 211 (2009). J.P. Morgan later raised the purchase 
price to $10 a share in March 2008 due to shareholder pressure. Id. at 225–26. 
2 Id. at 11, 210. 
3 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Merrill Is Sold; Failing to Find Buyer, Lehman Set to File 
for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1. 
4 See Michael J. de la Merced & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Brothers Hid Borrow-
ing, Examiner Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at A1. 
5 Eric Dash, Purchase of Merrill Fulfills Quest for a Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 
2008, at A18; see also KELLY, supra note 1, at 219; Sorkin, supra note 3. 
6 See KELLY, supra note 1, at 11, 217, 219. 
7 Id. at 217–19; see also Sorkin, supra note 3. 
8 See SEBASTIAN MALLABY, MORE MONEY THAN GOD: HEDGE FUNDS AND THE RISE 
OF A NEW ELITE 179 (2010). 
246 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:243 
 
increasing magnitude.9 Heavy reliance on leverage increases the amount 
of assets that must be sold as the firms require increasing amounts of capi-
tal to meet the margin calls.10 
During the first half of the Obama administration, policymakers, 
scarred by the public reaction to bailouts and loan guarantees, focused on 
crafting a new regulatory framework to prevent the need for such an 
overwhelming federal response in the future. On July 15, 2010, Congress 
passed the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, granting regulators more 
powers to regulate risky financial practices on Wall Street and imposing 
costly new reporting requirements on capital market participants.11 Nota-
ble provisions include: (1) the Volcker Rule, which mandates that regula-
tors set guidelines limiting the amount of capital that banks can risk in 
proprietary trading and investments with private equity and hedge funds; 
(2) guidelines dictating the regulators’ ability to break up dangerously 
large financial firms as a last resort before allowing markets to collapse; 
and (3) a last-resort clause allowing regulators to impose emergency 15:1 
leverage ratios on specific financial firms if necessary to prevent “grave 
threat[s] to the financial system.”12 
With respect to preventing future meltdowns, Dodd-Frank relied heav-
ily on granting greater power to regulators to prohibit high-risk financial 
practices; however, the legislation did not alter the incentives that original-
ly encouraged firms to engage in such practices. Financial reform that 
targets such incentives should focus primarily on the tax deduction for 
interest on business indebtedness. Section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code (IRC) allows businesses and individuals to deduct all interest pay-
ments “paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness,”13 as long 
as such interest payments relate to business activities.14 The deduction 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Brady Dennis, Senate Passes Landmark Bill in Triumph for Obama, WASH. POST, 
July 16, 2010, at A1. 
12 U.S. SENATE BANKING COMMITTEE, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL 
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 4–5 (2010), available at http://bank 
ing.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_
summary_Final.pdf [hereinafter DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM]. Due to space 
constraints, this Note will only touch briefly on a few aspects of the Dodd-Frank reform 
bill. 
13 I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006). 
14 Id. § 163(h) (disallowing deductions for all interest payments on personal indebted-
ness for individuals). A major exception to this rule is interest on a mortgage or home 
equity loan related to an individual taxpayer’s personal residence, which is fully deducti-
ble. Id. § 163(h)(3). 
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reduces the effective after-tax cost of employing leverage (indebtedness) 
in the capital structure of a firm.15 Moreover, the IRC contains no equiva-
lent deduction for employing equity capital, which raises the cost of equity 
relative to debt financing.16 IRC Section 311(a) disallows any deduction 
for corporate distributions of property, generally known as dividends, and 
the corporation receives no beneficial tax treatment from the dilution of 
ownership interest that occurs with equity fundraising.17 This difference in 
tax treatment is commonly known as the “debt-equity distinction,” and is 
widely believed to create distortions in capital markets that lead to nega-
tive economic consequences.18 
This Note argues that Congress committed a potentially serious error 
in its attempt to prevent future financial panics by failing to directly ad-
dress the debt-equity distinction. The deduction for business interest 
should be disallowed and replaced with a Cost-of-Capital-Allowance 
(COCA) deduction that makes no distinction between debt and equity at 
the level of the corporate entity.19 Through this tax reform, the extreme 
difference in tax treatment between debt and equity disappears, and the 
incentives of corporate managers evolve to pursue means of financing that 
carry the lowest absolute cost of capital, thus removing tax considerations 
from the decision-making process. 
Part I will discuss the tax treatment of leverage and equity at both the 
entity level and the investor level. Part II will analyze the impact of leve-
rage on the economy at both the micro and macro levels, illustrating how 
the financial activities of one firm can send shockwaves throughout the 
entire economy. Part III will briefly describe recent attempts and proposals 
                                                 
15 See Adam O. Emmerich, Comment, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-Equity Dis-
tinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 118, 131 (1985) (noting that a firm 
can reduce its after-tax cost of capital if it succeeds in re-characterizing equity as debt). 
16 See id. at 118 (explaining that this disparate treatment of debt and equity is well-
settled in tax law, though it lacks a clear rationale). 
17 See I.R.C. § 311(a). Corporations must recognize gain and pay tax on appreciated 
property distributed as dividends, though again no loss may be recognized on the distri-
bution of depreciated property. Id. § 311(b). 
18 See Ilan Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code with Which You Disagree: Doc-
trine, Optimal Tax, Common Sense, and the Debt-Equity Distinction, 88 N.C. L. REV. 
1217, 1222 (2010) (noting the debt-equity distinction “aggravated the recessionary im-
pact of the financial meltdown on the real economy because firms operating with low 
equity cushions are very dependent on their ongoing access to credit”); Katherine Pratt, 
The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1056 
(2000) (“This Article discusses the time-honored but outdated tax law distinction be-
tween corporate debt and equity. Economists and legal commentators and the Treasury 
Department have made various proposals to eliminate the debt-equity distinction.”). 
19 See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1139–45 (describing the COCA proposal). 
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for reform of financial practices, including Dodd-Frank and other propos-
als from legal scholars. Part IV will put forth the main thesis of ending the 
deduction for interest payments, with an emphasis on designing the tax 
code changes to promote economic growth. The conclusion will list con-
crete steps to be taken over the next couple of years to achieve the best 
possible outcome. 
In advancing its thesis, this Note will operate under two analytical 
frameworks designed to improve the final proposal and broaden its appeal. 
First, any changes to the tax code should be designed to promote, not 
hinder, long-term economic growth. The tax code contains several distor-
tions, and simply removing one distortion will not improve economic 
efficiency if tax reform is designed improperly and other distortions 
arise.20 In a 2004 law review article,21 Peter Orszag and William Gale 
listed several guidelines that tax reform plans should follow to promote 
growth: (1) the change must be either revenue-neutral or be contempora-
neously matched with corresponding spending changes; (2) the change 
must be designed to encourage new economic activity, not to reward exist-
ing activity; and (3) the change should reduce resources directed towards 
tax avoidance.22 This Note will aim to follow these guidelines elsewhere 
described as the theory of the “second-best”23and strive to account for 
additional distortions in the IRC while devising a solution for the debt-
equity distinction.24 
Second, this Note will operate within the framework of agency theory 
and the modern corporation. Specifically, this Note will acknowledge the 
divergence in economic interests between the shareholders and managers 
of a firm when discussing a firm’s decision-making process.25 This theory 
                                                 
20 See id. at 1056 (“The theory of the second-best posits that eliminating an economic 
distortion does not necessarily increase efficiency if other economic distortions remain.”). 
21 William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the 
Bush Administration, 2001–2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1157 (2004). 
22 See id. at 1192–94. See generally Paul Sullivan, Confusion over the Dormant Estate 
Tax Keeps Advisers Busy, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2010, at B6 (describing the efforts of 
wealthy individual taxpayers to take advantage of the one-year absence of the estate tax 
in 2010). 
23 See Edward J. McCaffrey, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 
849–50 (2005) (“Tax, because of its incentive effects and the limited information of 
government policymakers—not to mention administrative concerns—is in a deeply 
‘second-best’ situation. There is simply no a priori way to say that welfare would im-
prove [by substantially altering the tax code].”) (emphasis added). 
24 See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1056. 
25 See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. 
ECON. 288 (1980) (“Economists have long been concerned with the incentive problems 
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is relevant due to the different impact the debt-equity distinction has on 
both shareholders and corporate managers. Therefore, an optimal solution 
to this tax distortion must account for the divergence in economic interests 
between shareholders and managers to be successful.26 
I. TAX TREATMENT OF DEBT AND EQUITY 
The tax treatment of debt and equity financing instruments is complex, 
and for corporations this treatment varies significantly depending on 
whether the shareholder or the corporate entity is considered. This section 
describes the taxation of each form of financing in the context of corporate 
double taxation, first at the corporate entity level and then at the investor 
level. 
A. Treatment at the Entity Level 
The debt-equity distinction is most apparent at the entity level of taxa-
tion. IRC Section 163(a) allows businesses to deduct interest payments on 
indebtedness, regardless of whether the interest is related to short-term 
financing of current operations or the long-term financing of capital 
projects and expansion.27 This deduction is taken against both ordinary 
and capital gain income for corporations,28 and the amount of interest that 
may be deducted per tax year is limited only through the net operating loss 
provisions in IRC Section 172.29 Given the corporate marginal tax rate of 
35%,30 this deduction effectively reduces a firm’s cost of capital on debt 
financing by over one-third. Corporations use this tax shield heavily to 
increase after-tax net income; a Department of Commerce report con-
                                                                                                                         
that arise when decision making in a firm is the province of managers who are not the 
firm’s security holders.”). 
26 See discussion infra Parts I.A, I.B. 
27 See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006). 
28 See id. § 1211(a) (applying capital loss limitations only on losses due to sales or 
exchanges of capital assets). 
29 Both corporate and individual taxpayers may carry a net operating loss in the cur-
rent tax year back two years to wipe out previous tax liabilities. If any current losses 
remain, they may be carried forward to offset tax liabilities for the next twenty years until 
exhaustion. See id. § 172. 
30 Id. § 11(b). Corporations pay a marginal tax of 34% on all income between $75,000 
and $10,000,000, with all excess income taxed at a 35% rate. Personal service corpora-
tions pay a tax of 35% on all income earned in the tax year. Id. § 11(b)(2). 
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cluded that corporations deducted $2.085 trillion in interest payments in 
2007.31 
Financing operations with equity, however, does not provide corpora-
tions with a corresponding tax deduction for their cost of capital. IRC 
Section 311(a) disallows corporations from recognizing any losses or 
deductions on the distribution of dividends or the repurchase of stock.32 
Thus, if a corporation raises $100 of equity capital and pays out $10 in 
dividends each year, the after-tax cost of the dividends is the full $10. If 
the corporation raises the same $100 in bonds at a 10% interest rate, the 
corporation still owes $10 in interest payments each year. The corporation 
can reduce its taxable income by the same $10, however, and therefore 
reduce its tax liability. The after-tax cost of the interest payment is thus 
only $6.50, given a 35% marginal corporate tax rate. 
The stark contrast in tax treatment of debt and equity at the corporate 
level encourages firms to attempt to construct transactions that exhibit the 
form of debt financing but contain the substance of equity financing.33 
Debt financing brings better tax treatment, but equity financing potentially 
carries fewer restrictions on the flexibility of corporate managers;34 an 
instrument that combines both of these qualities is thus highly valuable. 
Though IRC Section 385(a) authorizes regulations to clarify this issue of 
“line-drawing,”35 the Treasury Department has so far left responsibility for 
deciding close calls to the judiciary.36 
B. Treatment at the Holder Level 
Taxation of debt and equity instruments at the investor level partially 
offsets the distortion at the entity level;37 however, the taxation of instru-
                                                 
31 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 496 
tbl.753 (130th ed. 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/ta 
bles/12s0753.pdf. 
32 I.R.C. § 311(a). 
33 See Benshalom, supra note 18, at 1221–22. 
34 See generally Pratt, supra note 18, at 1061–64 (providing an overview of the differ-
ent tax treatments and benefits of debt and equity financing). 
35 I.R.C. § 385(a); see also Benshalom, supra note 18, at 1222. 
36 See Benshalom, supra note 18, at 1235. Section 385(b) provides courts with five 
factors to consider when determining whether an instrument is equity or debt: (1) written, 
unconditional promises to repay; (2) any subordination or preference to the indebtedness 
of the firm; (3) the leverage ratio of the firm; (4) convertibility from debt to stock; and (5) 
the relationship between bondholders and shareholders of the firm. I.R.C. § 385(b). 
37 See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1090 (“[T]he corporate level tax advantages of using 
debt in the capital structure are offset to some degree because of investor level tax conse-
quences.”). 
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ment-holders carries less weight in the capital structure decision-making 
process for corporate managers than the taxation of the corporate entity.38 
Bondholders are taxed at the generally higher marginal rates of ordinary 
income for interest received;39 currently, the highest marginal rate on 
ordinary income for individuals is 35%.40 Bonds may be bought and sold 
for purposes of speculation, however, and any gain on such sales can be 
classified and taxed as a capital gain to the extent the gain is not due to 
original issue discount.41 
Conversely, shareholders currently receive favorable tax treatment on 
their instruments relative to ordinary income. Most individual shareholder-
taxpayers pay a low 15% marginal rate on dividends received as a result of 
the Bush-era tax cuts passed in 2003.42 Furthermore, individual sharehold-
ers pay the same low rate of 15% on capital gains on most equity instru-
ments held for more than one year.43 Losses on the sale of equity instru-
ments, regardless of how long the taxpayer held the instrument, can offset 
short-term capital gain, long-term capital gain, and $3,000 of ordinary 
                                                 
38 See id. at 1092–93 (“Even in light of all of the potential offsets to the tax advantag-
es of corporate debt, the consensus view of economists is that corporate debt is signifi-
cantly tax favored over corporate equity.”). 
39 I.R.C. § 64 (defining ordinary income as all income which is not the result of a sale 
or exchange of capital property as defined in Section 1231(b)). 
40 Id. § 1. This marginal rate for individuals in the highest tax bracket is set to persist 
through 2012 as a result of a December 2010 tax compromise between Republicans in 
Congress and President Obama. See Jim Kuhnhenn, Obama Salutes Spirit of Compro-
mise, Signs Tax Bill, BOSTON.COM (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.boston.com/business/tax 
es/articles/2010/12/17/obama_salutes_spirit_of_compromise_signs_tax_bill/. 
41 I.R.C. § 1271 (requiring amounts received in retirement of the bond’s principal or 
in exchange for the right to receive the bond’s principal to be classified as a capital ex-
change); Id. § 1272 (excluding gains attributable to original issue discount from the 
definition of a capital exchange). 
42 Id. § 1(h)(11). This tax rate is set to continue through 2012, again as a result of the 
December 2010 tax compromise between congressional Republicans and President Ob-
ama. See Kuhnhenn, supra note 40. Tax-exempt entities pay no tax on dividends received 
from equity investments, whereas corporations may take advantage of a dividends-
received deduction to eliminate any tax liability arising from the receipt of dividends 
themselves. See Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double 
Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517, 527 (2009) (citing I.R.C. § 243 (West 2008)). 
43 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (2006). The marginal tax rate for gains on the sale of equity securi-
ties held for less than one year is the ordinary income tax rate of the taxpayer. Id. 
§ 1222(11). If the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate for ordinary income is 15% or less, the 
taxpayer enjoys a 0% tax rate on capital gains income. Id. § 1(h)(1)(B). 
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income per tax year.44 The shareholder can carry forward any unused 
losses to future tax years until exhaustion.45 
One may reasonably assume that the favorable tax treatment of equity 
at the shareholder level compensates for the reverse treatment at the entity 
level. The interests of the managers running the firm diverge from those of 
shareholders, however, and therefore shareholder taxation is likely a rela-
tively minor consideration of corporate managers when making financing 
decisions.46 Scholar Michael Doran has argued that corporate shareholders 
support tax changes that “increase the value of existing capital,” whereas 
corporate managers prefer to lower the tax burden on new investment.47 
Moreover, managers can persuade shareholders that increased leverage 
will provide a higher valuation of the firm than will equity financing due 
to the tax shield, and this higher valuation will increase the value of the 
investors’ holdings.48 Therefore, the distinction in taxation at the entity 
level likely carries significantly more weight in the capital structure deci-
sion-making process. 
II. IMPACT OF LEVERAGING 
A firm’s strategy in building its capital structure and financing opera-
tions can have a tremendous impact on the success of the firm, both in the 
short- and long-term. This section describes a few consequences of capital 
structure strategies, beginning with an extremely basic overview of the 
                                                 
44 Id. § 1211(b). 
45 Id. § 1212(b). 
46 See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986) (noting that whereas shareholders desire cash 
payouts from the firm, managers desire to grow the resources of the firm, leading to 
common clashes of interest). 
47 Doran, supra note 42, at 532–33. Doran made these observations in the course of 
advancing his argument that, though shareholders support corporate tax integration, 
corporate managers are at best ambivalent and possibly even against full integration 
despite the likelihood of overall welfare benefits to the economy. See id. at 528–34 (cit-
ing U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON 
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS 
INCOME ONCE (1992)). An additional analogy to illustrate this divergence is found in the 
different tax consequences of a property tax versus an income tax. Shareholders would 
prefer lower property taxes, because that reduces the tax burden on their existing capital; 
managers would prefer lower income taxes to increase the gains to their future projects. 
48 See Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction 
Discourages Innovation and Risk Taking, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1461, 1469, 1481–82 (1993) 
(“[C]orporations trying to maximize their value will choose a capital structure that mini-
mizes total taxes ....”). 
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analytical framework for judging a firm’s capital structure decisions. The 
section then notes a few of the advantages and disadvantages of the use of 
leverage, both on a micro- and macro-economic scale. 
A. Capital Structure of a Firm 
Firms generally finance their activities with a combination of equity 
and debt, with the optimal structure constituting the formula that meets all 
financing needs with the lowest possible cost of capital.49 The Modigliani-
Miller Theorem, famous in the field of corporate finance, held that given a 
tax-free environment, the exact mix of debt and equity is irrelevant to a 
firm’s valuation.50 Taxes do impact the market, however, and debt rece-
ives a tax shield from the deductibility of interest payments.51 Thus, the 
value of a leveraged firm is equal to the value of the firm unleveraged plus 
the tax shield the firm receives from leverage.52 Therefore, assuming no 
marginal change in interest payments, a firm’s optimal capital structure 
may theoretically be all debt and no equity, because as leverage increases, 
so does the tax deduction.53 
Such a heavy reliance on leverage has drawbacks, especially in the 
form of financial distress costs. These costs include bankruptcy costs, 
higher costs of raising new debt, and higher transaction costs in normal 
business operations.54 Lenders require higher interest rates in return for the 
risk inherent in lending to an already highly-leveraged firm.55 Additional-
ly, due to provisions in the tax code limiting the ability of corporations to 
take advantage of the full amount of operating losses in a single tax year,56 
the value of the interest payment tax shield is limited to the extent of the 
firm’s annual pre-tax net income. Many scholars have thus observed the 
                                                 
49 Id. at 1467 (“Choosing the capital structure that minimizes the corporation’s cost of 
capital is desirable because it maximizes the value of the corporation.”). 
50 See Anne P. Villamil, The Modigliani-Miller Theorem, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.econ.uiuc.edu/~avil 
lami/course-files/PalgraveRev_ModiglianiMiller_Villamil.pdf. 
51 I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006). 
52 See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Share-
holder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1039, 1050–53 
(1998) (describing the “irrelevance theorem” put forth by Franco Modigliani and Merton 
Miller). 
53 Id. 
54 See generally id. at 1061–62 (listing several costs of financial instability that may 
result from a firm’s heavy reliance on leverage in its financial structure). 
55 Villamil, supra note 50, at 3. 
56 See I.R.C. § 172 (2006) (describing the carry-back and carry-forward limitations on 
net operating losses). 
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interest deduction tax shield has a declining marginal value as the leverage 
of a firm increases.57 
A more advanced version of the Miller-Modigliani Model accounts for 
these financial distress costs, though firms do not fully internalize some of 
these losses.58 The new model subtracts the costs from the value of a leve-
raged firm; otherwise equal to the value of the firm unleveraged plus the 
tax shield from debt.59 Some forms of financial distress costs, such as 
costs from bankruptcy, can be devastating to the firm and possibly end the 
life of the corporation.60 Due to the limited liability of the shareholders 
and management of a corporation, however, corporate managers have 
reduced incentives to caution against high-risk projects disproportionately 
financed with debt.61 Moreover, the phenomenon of “too-big-to-fail” firms 
presents problems of moral hazard, encouraging managers to act over-
aggressively with the knowledge that a significant share of any resulting 
losses will be passed on to the taxpaying public.62 
B. Benefits of Debt 
Debt offers benefits to individual firms through avenues other than the 
tax code. Increasing leverage to raise overall after-tax net income im-
proves several key financial metrics that stock analysts and investors often 
scrutinize, a move that favors existing shareholders and managers. Return 
on equity (ROE), an important financial metric for equity shareholders, 
                                                 
57 Knoll, supra note 48, at 1473–75. 
58 See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1089 (“The failing businesses’ failures to make interest 
payments may cause a domino effect in the economy, as creditors of the failing business-
es in turn find themselves unable to service their debt.”). See generally Knoll, supra note 
48, at 1475–77 (observing a firm’s financial distress imposes indirect costs on employees, 
suppliers, and customers). 
59 See Krawiec, supra note 52, at 1061–69. 
60 See Knoll, supra note 48, at 1475–81 (describing the direct and indirect costs of 
bankruptcy). 
61 See id. at 1478–79. 
62 See generally Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve, Address at the Exchequer 
Club in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents 
/speech/tarullo20091021a.htm (“The management and shareholders of the too-big-to-fail 
institution ... may thus be motivated to take greater risks with the cheaper funds.... If the 
risky projects pay off, the shareholders profit famously. If the results are bad, the gov-
ernment may keep the institution afloat, thereby preserving at least some value for share-
holders.”). 
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measures the proportion of a firm’s net income relative to its total equity.63 
The ratio can increase sharply as a result of a corporation selling bonds to 
finance profitable expansion, as the numerator of net income increases 
while the denominator of total equity remains constant. The same effect is 
present in the financial metric of earnings-per-share (EPS), which divides 
net income by outstanding shares of common stock.64 Financing profitable 
expansion with debt increases EPS more than if both equity and debt fi-
nancing are employed equally in the baseline capital structure, as debt 
financing alone does not change the denominator of outstanding shares of 
common stock. 
Additionally, shareholders may prefer debt because of the restrictions 
and oversight that loan covenants place on firm managers.65 Raising capi-
tal through equity offerings carries few restrictions on the flexibility of 
corporate managers, increasing their ability to manipulate the financial 
indicators of the firm to their advantage.66 Inherent to bond offerings, 
however, is a promise to pay out interest payments in a specified amount 
on a certain date.67 The mandate to pay out interest and eventually repay 
the principal motivates managers and employees to ensure operations 
perform at a level sufficient to meet these obligations.68 Additionally, loan 
agreements with large banks often include requirements and covenants as 
a condition of lending to the firm.69 These characteristics allow debt to 
reduce agency costs in the shareholder-manager relationship, providing 
                                                 
63 See generally Anthony Currie & Peter Thal Larsen, Morgan Stanley Makes 
Progress, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2010, at B2 (illustrating the importance of return on 
equity to investment bank analysts). 
64 See generally Bloomberg News, Forecast-Beating Profits Sustain a Market Rally, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2011, at B7 (noting 72% of S&P 500 companies reporting earnings 
in January and February 2010 beat EPS forecasts). 
65 See Jensen, supra note 46, at 324. 
66 Id. (“Managers with substantial free cash flow can increase dividends or repurchase 
stock and thereby pay out current cash that would otherwise be invested in low-return 
projects or wasted.”). The author does note reductions in the expected dividend payment 
are often penalized through reductions in the share price of the firm. Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 See Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control and the Need for Meaningful Board 
Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541, 560 (2010) (“These contracts, however, can and 
often do grant creditors the right to veto fundamental corporate transactions, receive 
financial information, observe board meetings, and appoint one or more directors or 
convert the debt into equity under certain circumstances.”). 
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managers with more incentive to act in the best interests of the sharehold-
ers of the firm.70 
A final benefit of the effective use of leverage is the potential to sub-
stantially increase gains from trading and speculation. Author and journal-
ist Sebastian Mallaby describes how early hedge funds in the 1950s–60s 
employed leverage to gain a sizable advantage over more risk-averse in-
vestors.71 Mallaby cites an example of a sophisticated speculator practic-
ing certain hedging techniques who borrows an amount equal to his origi-
nal pool of capital.72 Through leverage, the investor further diversifies his 
portfolio, and thus both decreases net exposure to the market and increases 
overall profitability.73 
Another example of leverage increasing rates of return can be found in 
the housing market prior to the recent recession. A “Seeking Alpha” ar-
ticle provides an example of an individual purchasing a home for 
$100,000.74 One option is for the individual to buy the home entirely with 
his own capital; if the home appreciates $10,000 in value, the purchaser 
has experienced a 10% rate of return.75 If the individual instead puts down 
only $10,000 of his own capital and borrows the remaining $90,000 at 6% 
interest, he is leveraged 10:1 and must pay $5,400 in interest in the current 
year.76 If the house experiences the same $10,000 appreciation in value, 
however, the purchaser has now experienced a 65% rate of return: the 
$10,000 appreciation divided by the sum of the $10,000 down payment 
and the $5,400 interest payment.77 Of course, a movement in price in the 
opposite direction has the reverse effect of wiping out the entirety of the 
taxpayer’s equity and placing the house on the verge of going underwater. 
                                                 
70 See Jensen, supra note 46, at 324 (“Thus debt reduces the agency costs of free cash 
flow by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers.”). 
71 MALLABY, supra note 8, at 23–28. 
72 Id. at 24–28. 
73 Id. at 24–25. Mallaby’s example imagines a traditional investor with $100,000, in-
vesting $80,000 in stocks and $20,000 in safe government bonds. A leveraged investor 
practicing hedging techniques borrows another $100,000, increases his long investment 
in stocks to $130,000, and exchanges his safe bonds for a short position in stocks worth 
$70,000. The leveraged investor has thus reduced his net exposure to the market from 
$80,000 to $60,000 while increasing his overall positions. 
74 Andy Singh, Leverage 101: The Real Cause of the Financial Crisis, SEEKING 
ALPHA (Sept. 25, 2008), http://seekingalpha.com/article/97299-leverage-101-the-real-cau 
se-of-the-financial-crisis. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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Finally, Mallaby describes the story of the 1990s hedge fund Long 
Term Capital Management (LTCM).78 LTCM, a firm founded by former 
Salomon Brothers vice chairman John Meriwether, employed advanced 
financial engineering techniques to greatly enhance profits on minimal 
amounts of equity.79 The firm employed complex “value-at-risk” calcula-
tions to gauge potential losses, and built an incredibly diversified portfolio 
of uncorrelated trades and positions to substantially minimize risk—at 
least in theory.80 Though the firm achieved a mere 2.45% return on total 
assets in 1995, through leverage this number transformed into a 42.8% 
return on contributed equity.81 This formula worked wonderfully for the 
hedge fund for several years; however, as this Note describes below, dual 
financial crises in East Asia and Russia in 1998 exposed the extreme vul-
nerability of high leverage and caused LTCM to blow up.82 
C. The Danger of Debt 
The downside to these methods is that fantastic success through leve-
rage quickly becomes a colossal failure if either asset prices fall or the risk 
managers leave a variable out of their calculations. Ezra Klein, in a 2010 
blog post for the Washington Post, captured the vulnerability of leverage 
to falling prices through a graph comparing leverage ratios to the propen-
sity of a firm to go underwater.83 For a firm without any leverage, only a 
complete loss of value in all assets will sink the firm.84 This results from 
pursuing a strategy of full capitalization and not investing beyond its 
means. A firm with a leverage ratio of 2:1, financing half of its invest-
ments with borrowed funds, requires a 50% drop in asset values to go 
underwater.85 This process of leverage increasing volatility continues to 
grow until a firm leveraged 40:1, right above the level of Bear Stearns 
immediately before its collapse, requires a drop in asset values of only 
2.5% to have its entire original investment wiped out.86 
                                                 
78 MALLABY, supra note 8, at 221–44. 
79 Id. at 221–22. 
80 Id. at 227–28. 
81 Id. at 227. 
82 Id. at 233–42. 
83 Ezra Klein, Explaining Financial Regulation: Leverage and Capital Requirements, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Apr. 20, 2010, 11:33 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com 
/ezra-klein/2010/04/explaining_financial_regulation.html. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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Both falling asset values and incomplete risk modeling contributed to 
the swift fall of LTCM. In May 1998, the firm began to experience set-
backs due to the market volatility arising out of financial crises in Indone-
sia, Japan, and Russia.87 In the span of one week in the middle of August, 
LTCM lost 15% of its capital: $550 million.88 LTCM reacted with hurried 
attempts to raise money, but the sales pitches only panicked other market 
participants even more, which in turn cost the fund more capital.89 LTCM 
then received margin calls from lenders seeking payment of interest, prin-
cipal, and posting of extra collateral; this forced the fund to dump assets at 
fire-sale prices, leading to further drops in asset values.90 The downward 
spiral continued until most of the major investment banks on Wall Street 
stepped in with an industry bailout to prevent the panic from spreading, 
foreshadowing the government bailout ten years later.91 
Encouraging debt over equity has consequences other than increased 
volatility. The distinction also shifts investment capital away from innova-
tive, high-risk startup companies and towards relatively safer and more 
stable firms in established industries.92 Michael Knoll, Co-Director of the 
Center for Tax Law and Policy at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School,93 points out that high-risk startup firms have less capacity for 
leverage in their capital structure because they do not have a consistent 
earnings history or steady cash flow.94 More established companies are in 
better positions to employ the interest deduction in devising their capital 
structure, substantially lowering their cost of capital.95 The overall cost of 
capital of a firm can act as a “hurdle rate” for judging new ventures and 
projects; managers and investors will pursue only those projects with an 
expected rate of return above the cost of capital.96 The interest deduction 
thus encourages greater investment in stable firms past their rapid growth 
period, increasing competition for startups in acquiring capital. 
                                                 
87 MALLABY, supra note 8, at 233–34. 
88 Id. at 234. 
89 Id. at 235–36. 
90 Id. at 236. 
91 Id. at 244. 
92 Knoll, supra note 48, at 1465–66 (“Thus, traditional technologies and industries are 
encouraged at the expense of emerging technologies, new production methods and high-
tech industries.”). 
93 Michael Knoll, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL: FACULTY, http:// 
www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/mknoll/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
94 Knoll, supra note 48, at 1486–88. 
95 Id. at 1488–89. 
96 Id. 
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This distinction between high and low debt capacity firms causes sev-
eral distortions in the broader economy. The first and most obvious distor-
tion is slower rates of innovation and development of new technologies 
and products.97 Second, the deduction distorts markets through the encou-
ragement of inefficient mergers between firms that separately have vola-
tile cash flows.98 Mergers between firms with uncorrelated earnings cycles 
can increase diversification and reduce volatility in future cash flows, 
allowing for higher debt capacity.99 This higher debt capacity allows the 
merged firm to utilize the interest deduction tax shield on a greater 
scale.100 Mergers have high failure rates, however, as many combinations 
do not produce higher shareholder value or increase rates of return.101 The 
interest deduction therefore encourages more mergers than are efficient by 
providing for the potential of greater tax savings.102 
Finally, the tax shield for leverage distorts the economy through slow-
er rates of job creation. A recent 2010 study by economists John Halti-
wanger, Ron Jarmin, and Javier Miranda argues that the common claim 
from politicians that “small businesses” are the primary engine of job 
growth is misleading.103 The study found a relatively small causal rela-
tionship between the small size of a firm and net job growth rates.104 Ra-
ther, the authors determined that the more robust and disproportionate 
engines of job growth are young startup firms, despite their small share of 
the overall U.S. labor market.105 Though young firms also have high rates 
                                                 
97 Id. at 1492–95. Knoll observes that these high-risk, high-reward assets are more 
likely to be intangible and created as the result of long R&D processes requiring steady 
investment. Id. at 1495. 
98 Id. at 1493. 
99 See Knoll, supra note 48, at 1493. 
100 Id. at 1466. 
101 See Kevin Voigt, Mergers Fail More Often than Marriages, CNN: WORLD 
BUSINESS (May 22, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/BUSINESS/05/21/merger.mar 
riage/index.html. A 2004 study by consulting firm Bain & Company found that 70% of 
mergers did not realize an increase in value to shareholders. Id. 
102 Knoll, supra note 48, at 1493–94 (“Thus, the corporate interest deduction encou-
rages inefficient conglomerate mergers. This reduces national income.”). 
103 John C. Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, & Javier Miranda, Who Creates Jobs? Small 
vs. Large vs. Young 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16300, 
2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16300 [hereinafter Who Creates Jobs]. 
104 Id. at 29. The authors conclude the “inverse relationship between [job] growth 
rates and [firm] size remains but is not overwhelming.” The authors speculate part of the 
cause behind the wide use of “small firm job creation” claims are “measurement issues” 
in the most often used data set, which “can lead to misleading inferences about the role of 
firm size in job creation.” Id. 
105 Id. at 30 (“Business startups account for roughly 3% of U.S. total employment in 
any given year.”). 
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of job destruction, successful small startups tend to have rapid growth 
rates due to the “up-or-out” dynamic.106 Specifically, startup firms consti-
tute 20% of gross job creation, which is more than six times their propor-
tion of the overall employment market at 3%.107 In contrast, older and 
larger firms constitute 40% of job creation, but this number is less than 
their overall share of the labor market, which is around 45%.108 
Young, dynamic startup firms with a disproportionate contribution to 
job creation rates in the United States are precisely the firms harmed 
through the investment distortion arising out of the interest deduction. 
These firms produce jobs both through the original startup process and, for 
those lucky few startups that achieve success, the rapid growth trajectory 
to mature firm status.109 Startups are much more likely to have low or 
nonexistent capacities for debt early in their life cycle,110 and therefore 
they cannot take full advantage of the easy tax shield inherent in the inter-
est deduction.111 Therefore, the interest deduction of the tax code slows 
job growth by directing investment away from those firms most likely to 
rapidly increase employment.112 
                                                 
106 Id. at 29–31. 
107 Id. at 31. 
108 See Who Creates Jobs, supra note 103, at 30–31. The authors define older, larger 
firms as being in business for longer than ten years and employing more than 500 work-
ers. Id. 
109 Id. at 25 (describing the “up-or-out” dynamic among young, high-risk startup 
firms). 
110 Knoll, supra note 48, at 1486–95. 
111 See id. at 1496. 
112 Innovative, technology-based companies often receive other tax benefits that, in 
some cases, more than compensate for the disadvantage inherent in their capital structure. 
Recent newspaper and magazine articles have pointed out that companies in the biotech-
nology, drug, and internet industries pay the lowest marginal corporate tax rate in the 
U.S. as a whole, with the capital-intensive utility and oil industries at the other end of the 
spectrum. Reasons cited for the disparity include tax breaks for research and development 
spending, as well as favorable tax rates on income earned overseas. See David Leonhardt, 
The Paradox of Corporate Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2011, at B1 (noting the United 
States imposes one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world, yet collects a relatively 
small percentage of overall revenue through the tax); Derek Thompson, Who “Wins” 
Under Our Bizarre and Complicated Corporate Tax System?, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 
(Jan. 28, 2011, 12:52 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/01/who 
-wins-under-our-bizarre-and-complicated-corporate-tax-system/70428/ (“Companies with 
high R&D spending or a large overseas presence pay very little, and companies that do 
business mostly inside the U.S. pay very high.”). A possible argument in support of the 
distortion in favor of established companies is that young startup firms have high failure 
rates and thus lead to job destruction, in addition to robust job creation. This characteris-
tic of young startup firms plays a valuable role in our economy, however, allowing hu-
man and physical capital to move from inefficient products and firms to more efficient 
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III. RECENT ATTEMPTS AT FINANCIAL REFORM 
The federal government has been tremendously active in recent years 
regarding matters of financial regulation and banking oversight. Further, 
legal scholars have proposed several additional measures to address the 
debt-equity distinction. As will be discussed below, however, these pro-
posals do not adequately address the incentives behind the dangerous 
financial practices that caused the recent financial panic. A brief discus-
sion of these proposals will help illuminate the case for substituting the 
interest deduction with a COCA deduction. 
A. Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill 
The Dodd-Frank bill aimed to prevent, among other things, several of 
the problems common to over-leveraged companies discussed above.113 
The comprehensive legislation contains several major provisions dealing 
with disparate aspects of the financial system, ranging from consumer 
credit practices to shareholder input on executive pay to limits on banks 
investing with hedge funds.114 As mentioned in the introduction, the bill 
further provides federal regulators with several powers of last resort, in-
cluding the imposition of a strict leverage ratio cap and the ability to break 
up firms posing systemic risk to the financial system.115 The “Volcker 
Rule,” limiting proprietary trading, has angered investment banks which 
had previously wildly profited from the activity.116 Additionally, the new 
consumer financial regulations have raised the ire of credit card companies 
and consumer mortgage lenders.117 
                                                                                                                         
firms. This process, often called “creative destruction,” increases economic output and 
raises the standard of living for the average individual. See John L. Orcutt, Improving the 
Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of 
Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 861 (2005) (“These 
newly created ventures must be more innovative and productive than their already estab-
lished competitors in order to compete, which has the added benefit of forcing the estab-
lished competitors to improve.” (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, 
AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950))). 
113 See DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM, supra note 12. 
114 Id.; see also Dennis, supra note 11. 
115 DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM, supra note 12, at 4. 
116 See Floyd Norris, Volcker Rule May Work, Even if Vague, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 
2011, at B1 (“[Bankers] had hoped for clear rules that could be complied with—or 
evaded, if you want to be cynical.”). 
117 See Damian Paletta, Fight over Consumer Agency Looms as Overhaul Is Signed, 
WALL ST. J., July 22, 2010, at A1 (“The new consumer regulator will be funded by the 
Federal Reserve and have independent powers to write and enforce rules governing how 
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More relevant to this Note, however, are provisions giving Federal Re-
serve regulators the discretionary power to impose a 15:1 hard leverage 
cap on financial firms conclusively judged to be a grave threat to the 
health of the financial system.118 Several policymakers argued that giving 
experienced regulators the discretion to impose this relatively stringent 
leverage ratio will be an effective tool in preventing future financial pan-
ics.119 As journalist Sebastian Mallaby points out, however, the traditional 
leverage ratio is a blunt metric with several failings.120 First, the ratio 
“fail(s) to account for swaps and options,” financial instruments that 
played a substantial role in the financial crisis.121 Second, the ratio fails “to 
distinguish between hedged bets and unhedged ones,” though the former 
pose relatively little risk to the health of a firm if structured properly.122 
Finally, the ratio compares only total assets to capital—not potential losses 
to capital—though the latter ratio is more indicative of a firm’s threat to 
the financial system.123 
As a last resort against a meltdown, Dodd-Frank may ultimately be a 
tremendous improvement from the regulatory apparatus in place before 
the recent financial crisis. However, as a means of preventing the need for 
such a strong government response in the future, Dodd-Frank does little to 
alter the incentives for large banking firms to pursue risky capital structure 
and financing strategies. 
The bill employs strict regulation of the financial and investment prac-
tices of banking and investing institutions.124 Nonetheless, the prospect of 
large profits remains on the other side of the new regulations. Thus, finan-
cial firms will have strong incentives to water down the new rules through 
lobbying and complex legal, accounting, and financial methods designed 
                                                                                                                         
loans and other financial products are offered, bearing on everything from the type of 
mortgages people can get to the fees on their credit cards.”). 
118 DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM, supra note 12, at 4. 
119 See Dennis, supra note 11. 
120 MALLABY, supra note 8, at 228. 
121 Id. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 29 (2010). Lewis describes a 
credit default swap as essentially “an insurance policy” on a bond, whereby the buyer of 
the swap receives a payout from the seller exponentially higher than the purchase price if 
the bond issuer defaults. At its peak, AIG had insured approximately $50 billion worth of 
credit default swaps on consumer loan securities, 95% of which constituted subprime 
mortgages. Id. at 90. 
122 MALLABY, supra note 8, at 228. 
123 Id. Mallaby notes LTCM employed a metric that accounted for some of these dis-
advantages in the 1990s. Id. 
124 See DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM, supra note 12, at 4–5, 8 (recommend-
ing stricter regulations for “capital, leverage, liquidity, risk management and other re-
quirements”). 
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to give the appearance of compliance. Additionally, the question of 
whether market conditions have sufficiently deteriorated to warrant impos-
ing the tough new measures may not be anything more than a judgment 
call,125 and banking executives are certain to exert some influence over 
this decision. 
B. Dividend Deduction Proposal 
Some scholars have recently renewed a proposal for allowing corpora-
tions a deduction for dividends paid to mirror the interest payment deduc-
tion.126 The argument for a dividend deduction is similar to that of the 
dividend tax cut contained within the tax cut legislation of 2003.127 Both 
approaches attempt to mitigate the debt-equity distinction through reduc-
ing the relative tax burden on equity financing while leaving the interest 
deduction untouched.128 The dividend tax cut falls on the shareholder level 
of the corporate double tax, whereas the dividend deduction affects the 
taxation of the corporate entity.129 An advantage of the dividend deduction 
is that it avoids the problem of agency through targeting managerial deci-
sion-making directly.130 On the other hand, the dividend deduction retains 
many problems of the dividend tax cut, and adds significant, unique dis-
advantages that make the proposal more problematic than removal of the 
interest deduction.131 
Reuven Avi-Yonah and Amir C. Chenchinski argue for a dividend de-
duction primarily to integrate the corporate and individual tax systems,132 
but they cite mitigating the debt-equity distinction as a secondary bene-
                                                 
125 See Financial Reform in America: A Decent Start, THE ECONOMIST, July 1, 2010, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/16481494. 
126 REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH & AMIR C. CHENCHINSKI, CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION 
AND THE DEBT/EQUITY DISTINCTION: THE CASE FOR DIVIDEND DEDUCTION 4 (2010), 
available at https://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.downloa 
d&file_id=55888. 
127 See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, H.R. 2, 108th Cong. 
§ 301(a)-(c) (2003). The legislation reduced the maximum capital gains rate to 15% and 
moved most dividends into the capital gains category. 
128 See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1133–35. 
129 See id. at 1133. 
130 See AVI-YONAH & CHENCHINSKI, supra note 126, at 8 (describing how the divi-
dend deduction automatically affects both managers and shareholders). 
131 See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1134–35 (outlining several drawbacks to a corporate 
level dividend deduction, including loss of tax revenue, increasing net operating loss 
distortions, and inverting the debt-equity bias towards equity). 
132 See AVI-YONAH & CHENCHINSKI, supra note 126, at 4 (“The right form of integra-
tion, we would argue, is dividend deduction.”). 
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fit.133 These scholars argue that a dividend deduction achieves the desired 
result of reducing the tax bias against corporations,134 but that it is de-
signed more narrowly than similar proposals.135 This is because the deduc-
tion directly affects only management behavior with no impact on the 
taxation of shareholders.136 Further, they argue that the dividend deduction 
fully addresses the inherent bias of corporate managers towards retaining 
earnings to increase share price, whereas other proposals only partially 
compensate for this bias at best.137 Finally, they state that the proposal will 
create “true debt/equity parity” without disallowing a deduction for inter-
est expense, which they claim is “a legitimate cost of doing business.”138 
Regarding the bias towards retention, the dividend deduction will be 
problematic regardless of whether the proposal achieves the intended 
effect. On one hand, the proposal may suffer from pitfalls that scholars 
identified with the 2003 dividend tax cut and not generate enough new 
activity.139 Steven Bank and Katherine Pratt argue separately that the large 
increase in dividends immediately after passage of the 2003 tax cut140 was 
likely a result of the temporary nature of the change; under the 2003 legis-
lation, tax rates on dividends were scheduled to increase back to their 
previous levels in 2011.141 Companies distributed record amounts of divi-
dends to shareholders to take advantage of a temporary decrease in tax 
rates, but did not make fundamental changes in dividend policy.142 A per-
manent change in the tax treatment of dividends would not strongly im-
pact the dividend policy of corporations, as the tax code would not provide 
a “limited time only” windfall on which firms could capitalize.143 There-
                                                 
133 Id. at 2–3. 
134 Id. at 9. 
135 The authors compare a dividend deduction against proposals for a comprehensive 
business income tax and exemption of dividends received at the holder-level. Id. at 8–10. 
136 Id. at 8. 
137 Id. at 9 (“The bias against retention is only partially addressed by dividend exemp-
tion and imputation, because distribution decisions are taken by managers who may not 
care very much about the shareholder tax.”). 
138 See AVI-YONAH & CHENCHINSKI, supra note 126, at 10. 
139 See Steven A. Bank, Dividends and Tax Policy in the Long Run, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 533, 536 (2007); Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as 
the Handmaiden of Budget Policy, 41 GA. L. REV. 503, 533 (2007). 
140 Bank, supra note 139, at 534. S&P 500 companies paid out a record $202 billion 
in dividends in 2005, followed by another predicted $225 billion in 2006. Id. 
141 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, H.R. 2, 108th Cong. 
§ 303 (2003). 
142 Bank, supra note 139, at 557–58. 
143 Id. 
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fore, a temporary dividend deduction would mitigate the retained earnings 
bias only to a limited extent. 
Conversely, if the dividend deduction does permanently alter the divi-
dend policies of firms, this will result in a huge windfall for existing 
shareholders. This conflicts with several of the tenets put forth by Gale 
and Orszag regarding designing tax changes to encourage economic 
growth.144 Large shareholders would enjoy great increases in dividends 
despite not altering their economic behavior from before the tax change.145 
Gale and Orzsag argue this windfall will lower the increase in efficiency 
arising as a result of the tax change, especially when coupled with the 
increase in government interest costs arising from the additional deficit 
financing.146 
The deficit plays an important role in another drawback of Avi-
Yonah’s proposal. The federal government would experience a potentially 
significant loss of revenue if firms could deduct dividend payments;147 to 
prevent increased deficits, Congress must enact corresponding spending 
reductions and tax increases. If Congress follows the path of the 2003 tax 
cut, long-term budget deficits for the federal government will increase 
substantially.148 Pratt lists several costs associated with larger government 
deficits, including: (1) crowding out of private investment, (2) higher 
interest rates, and (3) diversion of government resources from programs 
designed to support growth in favor of interest payments on the debt.149 
Pratt has questioned whether increasing total dividends will generate 
enough positive economic growth to overcome such heavy costs.150 
                                                 
144 Gale & Orszag, supra note 21, at 1192–94. 
145 See generally Bank, supra note 139, at 557 (describing a commonly held view 
among commentators that reducing taxation of equity via dividend policy “would be a 
one-time windfall to existing investors”). 
146 See Gale & Orszag, supra note 21, at 1194–96 (stating an increase in government 
deficits “will reduce income and raise interest rates significantly in that year and future 
years and hence will make the environment for long-term growth more difficult”). 
147 S&P 500 firms paid out $202 billion in dividends in 2005 and were expected to 
pay out another $225 billion in 2006. See Bank, supra note 139, at 534. Assuming a 35% 
corporate tax rate, allowing a dividend deduction would result in a $70.7 billion revenue 
loss in 2005 and a $78.75 billion revenue loss in 2006 for the federal government from 
S&P 500 firms alone. 
148 See Pratt, supra note 139, at 539 (noting that Congress financed the 2003 dividend 
tax cut entirely through deficit financing). 
149 Id. at 540. Pratt also cites increased dependence on foreign investors as another 
cost of government borrowing. Id. 
150 Id. at 543 (“Economists have concluded the 2003 dividend tax cut could promote 
long-term growth only if it were not deficit-financed.”). Pratt would also include another 
requirement for tax cuts to meet before they are judged to be economically beneficial. 
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Finally, the dividend deduction has one significant problem that it does 
not share with a dividend tax cut. Allowing a deduction for dividends 
provides managers a tool to substantially manipulate tax liabilities through 
increased or decreased distributions. A firm’s dividend policy may have 
no rational connection to the firm’s overall performance during the year in 
terms of gross income and ability to pay a dividend.151 Because the task of 
setting dividend policy is generally within the exclusive control of man-
agement, managers can alter the amount of dividends paid to manipulate 
the after-tax net income the firm reports to the IRS and to shareholders.152 
This manipulation can partially mask a firm’s weaknesses, thereby both 
reducing the incentives of managers to make substantive improvements to 
the business and potentially misleading investors. Such potential conse-
quences of tax liability manipulation weigh strongly against the imple-
mentation of the dividend deduction proposal.153 
IV. DISALLOW THE DEDUCTION FOR BUSINESS INTEREST 
A. Eliminating the Interest Deduction 
The most direct path to both equalizing tax treatment of debt and equi-
ty and removing incentives for managers to over-leverage is to abolish the 
corporate interest deduction. The decision of whether to finance operations 
and expansion with equity or debt should be made pursuant to the business 
nature of the undertaking, not the tax code. The reform of Section 163(a) 
will place equity on equal terms with leverage regarding taxation of the 
corporate entity through removal of the large tax shield associated with 
                                                                                                                         
The tax cut must “not increase the growing inequality in the United States.” Id. at 508. A 
dividend deduction would be hard-pressed to meet this requirement, as Pratt’s calcula-
tions indicate that dividends “flow disproportionately to high-income taxpayers.” Id. at 
551–52. 
151 See Melly Alazraki, Dividend Hikes, Like Wal-Mart’s, Aren’t Always Great News 
for Investors, DAILYFINANCE (Mar. 6, 2009, 9:30 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/sto 
ry/investing/wal-mart-raises-dividend-but-others-should-proceed-with-caution/1479871/ 
(noting forty companies in the S&P 500 increased dividends during the nadir of the 
recent recession, compared with thirty companies that reduced dividends). 
152 See Stephen A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms, 61 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1159, 1207 (2004) (explaining the strong opposition from corporate managers to 
proposals designed to interfere with their decision-making regarding dividend policy). 
153 See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1134, 1155 (arguing that two drawbacks of a dividend 
deduction may be “reduced monitoring of corporate managers” and loss of tax revenue 
for the government). 
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leverage.154 Managers lose the tax incentive to increase leverage beyond 
normal business considerations, and the continuing legal fight over how to 
classify ambiguous “hybrid” instruments into certain categories mostly 
comes to an end.155 
One likely criticism of this proposal is Avi-Yonah’s statement that “in-
terest is a legitimate cost of business,” and should therefore be deductible 
from net income.156 Avi-Yonah singles out financial institutions in particu-
lar, arguing that to eliminate the interest deduction is to “effectively tax 
them on gross interest income.”157 The question of the true nature of inter-
est is more complicated, however, than Avi-Yonah’s statement suggests. 
Interest payments are a cost of capital equivalent to dividend payments, 
rather than an operating cost such as cost of goods sold, depreciation, or 
overhead.158 The amount of interest paid is often more closely connected 
to the financing arrangements the firm makes with lenders and bondhold-
ers, not the economic performance of the firm during a given period.159 
The comparison is similar to the distinction between variable costs and 
fixed capital costs: the former are deductible as they are incurred and/or 
paid out, but the latter must be capitalized and deducted over the useful 
life of the underlying asset.160 A deduction for interest, therefore, is not 
necessary for the firm to obtain an accurate picture of net income. 
The incurring of interest is thus a consequence of choosing to acquire 
capital through leverage, and not necessarily a constant fact of life for an 
ongoing business. This is not to argue that a firm should not be allowed a 
                                                 
154 See id. at 1136 (observing that eliminating the corporate interest deduction would 
remove the “tax-advantaged” status of debt financing). 
155 See Emmerich, supra note 15, at 119 (“An analysis of the debt-equity classifica-
tion problem demonstrates that any attempt to draw a principled distinction between the 
two will be fruitless.”). 
156 AVI-YONAH & CHENCHINSKI, supra note 139, at 10. In the event of a repeal of 
Section 163(a), policymakers and tax attorneys may believe it necessary to include a 
provision specifically disallowing a business deduction for interest in light of Section 
162(a), which allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses. I.R.C. 
§ 162(a) (2006). 
157 AVI-YONAH & CHENCHINSKI, supra note 139, at 10. 
158 See Michael J. McIntyre, An Inquiry into the Special Status of Interest Payments, 
1981 DUKE L.J. 765, 766 (1981) (“Interest is a type of rental payment—an amount paid 
for the use of borrowed money.”). 
159 Id. at 795 (noting the tax shelter opportunities available when borrower and lender 
agree to a repayment schedule allowing for the “mismatching of ... interest payments with 
the income they help generate”). 
160 I.R.C. § 263(a) (2006) (disallowing deductions for capital expenditures); id. 
§ 167(a) (allowing a reasonable deduction for depreciation in value of property used in a 
trade, business, or production of income). 
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deduction for its cost of capital; the point, rather, is that IRC-granted de-
ductions should not be based on the mere choice of one form of capital 
over another, especially when the tax-favored choice can impose heavy 
externalities on the broader economy.161 The interest deduction should 
therefore be eliminated and replaced with a deduction that does not pro-
vide either method with an undue tax advantage. 
B. The COCA Replacement 
Allowing firms a fixed deduction for their cost of capital completes the 
proposal for ending the debt-equity distinction. As suggested in the sub-
section above, merely repealing Section 163(a), thereby disallowing de-
ductions for interest, may create another distortion as it corrects the distor-
tion of encouraging over-leverage.162 One potential problem is that the 
change is effectively a large tax increase on corporations at a moment 
when the United States is attempting to improve its economic competi-
tiveness in the global marketplace.163 Second, disallowing a deduction for 
interest may swing the debt-equity pendulum too far in the other direction. 
Differential tax treatment between debt and equity would remain for 
shareholders in the form of lower tax rates on capital gains and divi-
dends.164 This may over-encourage investment back towards startup cor-
porations and firms with higher reliance on equity, generating a bubble 
similar to the “dot-com” craze of the late 1990s.165 
Encouraging heavier reliance on equity at the expense of leverage may 
be beneficial for the economy. Shareholders may have incentives to be 
more judicious regarding their investments, and equity does not have the 
same potential for heavy social costs as debt. Regardless, firms should be 
allowed some form of a deduction for their cost of capital to ensure their 
taxable income reflects profits earned, and not absolute gross income. 
Therefore, the interest deduction should be replaced with a COCA deduc-
tion applied to the entire capitalization of the corporation.166 
                                                 
161 See generally Benshalom, supra note 18, at 1222 (“The debt-equity distinction 
problem is unique because of the huge social costs it imposes ....”). 
162 See supra Part IV.A. 
163 See Pratt, supra note 18, at n.398 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 544 tbl.863 (1l8th ed. 1998)). U.S. corporations 
deducted $2.085 trillion in interest payments in 2007, which translates into a $729.75 
billion revenue loss for the government at the current 35% corporate tax rate. 
164 I.R.C. § 1(h). 
165 See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1138. 
166 See generally id. at 1139–45 (describing the COCA proposal). 
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Under Pratt’s definition, the amount a firm may deduct as a COCA 
equals a fixed percentage of the corporation’s “aggregate capitalization,” 
including both equity and debt.167 Congress, possibly with the help of the 
Treasury Department, will have the responsibility of setting the COCA 
percentage, and can make further adjustments depending on the economic 
situation and the market rate for capital. Thus, if a firm has $50 million of 
capital including $20 million of equity and $30 million of debt, the 
amount of interest the corporation pays on the debt is irrelevant for tax 
purposes. However, if the fixed COCA percentage is 10%, the firm can 
deduct $5 million ($50 million x 10%) from gross income as a COCA 
deduction. This permitted deduction will stay constant if the firm converts 
equity into debt and vice versa. 
C. The Second-Best Justification 
Substituting COCA for the interest deduction allows firms to continue 
to deduct a significant portion of their cost of capital, yet removes the tax 
incentives that encourage managers to over-leverage. Continuing the 
theory of the second-best, other distortions remain in the form of benefi-
cial tax treatment accorded to shareholders relative to bondholders.168 This 
distinction at the holder-level may encourage managers to over-finance 
with equity. Replacing the interest deduction with a COCA deduction 
remains justified, however, for several reasons. 
First, the lingering distinction for shareholders will likely cause less 
distortion than the current tax treatment due to the divergence in economic 
interests between shareholders and corporate managers.169 As mentioned 
above,170 shareholders have the incentive to support tax reform that max-
imizes the value of their investments, whereas managers prefer a tax 
reform that lowers the cost of new investments.171 Managers may consider 
several other factors in a financing decision, including which method has a 
lower overall cost of capital, before considering the tax treatment of inves-
tors.172 Therefore, the beneficial tax treatment of shareholders relative to 
                                                 
167 Id. at 1139–40. Pratt suggests setting the fixed percentage at a level sufficient to 
either: (1) make the COCA-for-interest substitution revenue neutral, or (2) track the risk-
free interest rate on Treasury bonds. Id. at 1140. 
168 See id. at 1056. 
169 See Fama, supra note 25, at 288. 
170 See supra Part I.B. 
171 Doran, supra note 42, at 532–33. 
172 See generally Pratt, supra note 18, at 1155 (arguing that corporate managers would 
likely oppose any proposals that create a bias against retained earnings, regardless of any 
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bondholders alone will likely have a smaller distortionary impact than the 
current distinction for the corporate entity. 
Second, a distinction favoring equity is less likely to inflict heavy ex-
ternalities on the broader economy than the current tax code. Both debt 
and equity investments can be wiped out if the underlying asset goes un-
der, representing a loss of capital to the economy. Shareholders do not 
contribute equity to a corporation with the obligation that the firm repay 
the funds on a specific date. Instead, shareholders receive ownership in the 
firm as well as a right to receive any dividends that the firm pays out.173 
The firm takes full possession of the equity proceeds to employ at their 
discretion, reducing the risk that the firm will fail to meet its obligations 
and descend into insolvency.174 
Third, the proposal benefits innovative startup firms, which often must 
rely more heavily on equity. As discussed above,175 innovative startup 
firms with less predictable cash flows and higher proportions of intangible 
assets have lower debt capacities than established firms with fungible, 
tangible assets.176 Raising the cost of capital for leverage relative to equity 
should encourage more investment in firms with heavier reliance on equi-
ty, which will benefit high-risk startup firms. Further, the recent Halti-
wanger study discussed above177 indicates such firms contribute to job 
growth rates disproportionately to their overall share of the private sector 
labor market, as success at this early stage often brings rapid growth.178 
Therefore, lowering the relative cost of equity could increase opportunities 
for rapid job creation. 
Fourth, allowing a deduction of only a fixed percentage of a firm’s 
cost of capital may act as a soft cap on “too-big-to-fail” banks. The current 
tax code allows firms to deduct the full amount of the increased interest 
costs from high leverage, provided the firm has net income to offset. If the 
                                                                                                                         
tax advantages that the proposals may grant to the shareholders of those same corpora-
tions). 
173 See generally David P. Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and Debt in the 
New Financial Environment, 49 TAX L. REV. 499, 500 (1994) (“Equity permits an inves-
tor to participate in corporate profits in exchange for assuming corporate risk. Debt, on 
the other hand, permits an investor to avoid risk, in so far as that is possible, in exchange 
for forgoing participation.”). 
174 See generally Kelli A. Alces, Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Struc-
ture, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 787, 789–90 (2010). 
175 See supra Part II.C. 
176 Knoll, supra note 48, at 1486–88. 
177 See supra Part II.C. 
178 Who Creates Jobs, supra note 103, at 29–31 (describing the “up-or-out” dynamic 
among young, high-risk startup firms). 
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deduction is limited to a fixed percentage, managers will have no incentive 
to push leverage beyond the point at which actual interest equals the fixed 
percentage.179 Knoll writes that the optimal capital structure of a firm is 
the point “when the additional tax shield benefits equal the additional 
financial distress costs at the margin.”180 Capping the tax shield benefits 
available to a firm lowers the optimal amount of leverage for the firm. 
Therefore, firms will have less incentive to continue ever-greater expan-
sion through leverage beyond the point at which their failure can be ab-
sorbed by natural market forces, reducing the likelihood of future govern-
ment bailouts. 
Finally, swapping a lopsided tax preference in favor of debt for a mi-
nor tax preference towards equity meets the criteria for promoting eco-
nomic growth set forth by Gale and Orszag.181 The first criterion is that of 
revenue-neutrality: tax reform should not increase the deficit so as to in-
crease interest costs and crowd out private investment.182 The satisfaction 
of this standard will be the responsibility of Congress upon setting the 
fixed percentage of capital allowable to firms as a COCA deduction. 
Second, Gale and Orszag advise that tax reform should encourage changes 
in economic activity and not merely provide “windfall” benefits to taxpay-
ers for engaging in activity that they would have undertaken regardless of 
the change.183 This proposal encourages corporations to curtail funding 
operations with high-interest leverage and to instead pursue financing with 
the lowest absolute pre-tax cost of capital, including financial distress 
costs. Equity funding will become more valuable relative to debt, encour-
aging new equity investment and satisfying the above second criteria. 
The proposal meets the third and final criterion, as a fixed COCA de-
duction reduces the need for firms to direct substantial resources towards 
tax avoidance.184 A firm may now deduct no more than a fixed, statutory 
                                                 
179 See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1139–40. 
180 Knoll, supra note 48, at 1482. 
181 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
182 See Gale & Orszag, supra note 21, at 1194–96 (describing the effects of the 2001 
and 2003 tax cuts on deficits and private investment). 
183 See id. at 1196–97 (describing the significant “income effects” of the 2001 and 
2003 tax cuts which “will reduce labor supply, saving, and investment”). 
184 See id. at 1193 (arguing that reducing resources directed towards tax avoidance 
“can improve the allocation of resources and hence raise economic growth even without 
increasing the level of labor and capital inputs”); see also David Kocieniewski, At G.E. 
on Tax Day, Billions of Reasons to Smile, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2011, at A1 (noting 
General Electric incurred no tax liability in 2010, despite reporting worldwide profits of 
$14.2 billion and domestic profits of $5.1 billion). 
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percentage of its total capitalization as its COCA deduction.185 Increasing 
the cost of capital beyond this percentage drains from the after-tax net 
income of the firm and provides no extra tax shield. Therefore, firms have 
an incentive to pursue financing solely on the basis of the lowest absolute 
pre-tax cost of capital. 
CONCLUSION 
This proposal has the potential to have as dramatic an impact on capi-
tal markets as any provision in the recent Dodd-Frank financial reform 
bill. Therefore, it is important for Congress to implement this proposal or 
similar tax reform legislation gradually and incrementally. Immediately 
disallowing a deduction for business interest could constitute a large hit on 
the bottom line of many financial firms, possibly destabilizing capital 
markets once again. Moreover, an immediate change may trigger a broad 
deleveraging process in the corporate ranks similar to the trend among 
American consumers over the past few years.186 Such deleveraging re-
moves potential spending and investment from the national economy and 
constitutes a drain on economic growth.187 Congress can mitigate these 
possible effects by dragging out the implementation of the deduction 
switch over multiple years and providing a roadmap to taxpayers at the 
beginning of the process. 
This Note does not argue that Dodd-Frank is inefficient and should be 
repealed, nor does this Note support Dodd-Frank in all its manifestations. 
Rather, this Note argues that recent financial reform is incomplete as long 
as the incentives of corporations to engage in risky financial behavior do 
not change. Replacing the business interest deduction with a COCA de-
duction represents a big step towards reducing the likelihood of a second 
round of the expensive and morally troubling federal government inter-
ventions of 2008–2009 in the near future. 
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185 See supra Part IV.B. 
186 See Paul Krugman, Block Those Metaphors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2010, at A25. 
187 Id. (“This would be fine if someone else were taking up the slack. But what’s ac-
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